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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS-Right of Insured Minor to Change the Bene-
ficiary. The insured, a minor, took out a $1,000.00 policy with the
insurer. The policy was duly issued and the wife of insured was
designated the beneficiary. The right to change the beneficiary
)vas expressly reserved within the policy to the insured. The insured
before obtaining his majority lost the policy and requested a dupli-
cate thereof. The insured signed a release on original policy and
requested that the beneficiary named in original policy be changed
-from his wife to his grandfather. The insurer issued a duplicate
accordingly. The grandfather paid premiums from this date for-
ward. The insured died while still in his minority. This action was
thereupon commenced by the wife of insured against the insurer
and insured's grandfather claiming that she is the legal beneficiary
under the policy. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's conten-
tions. On appeal, HELD, reversed. The change was duly made
and insured minor was competent to effect the change of beneficiary.
Drynman v. Liberty Life Insurance Co., 216 S. C. 177, 57 S. E. 2d
163 (1950).
It has long been settled that a contract entered into by an infant
is voidable by the infant, but is binding upon the party to the con-
tract who is in his majority. Hanks v. Deal, 3 McCord 257 (1825) ;
Surter v. Gordon, 2 Hill Eq. 121 (1835). An infant who is a party
to a contract may enforce it and is entitled to all rights that are
stated therein. Eubanks v. Peak, 2 Bailey 497 (1831) ; and by in-
ference in Hammossopoulo v. Hainmossopoulo, 134 S. C. 54, 131 S. E.
319 (1923). It is universally held that an insurance policy taken
out by a minor on his own life is a valid contract, voidable only at
the will of the minor, and if not voided by him, is binding on the
insurer. Pippen v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 130 N. C. 23, 40
S. E. 822; Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 63 Ohio St. 478,
59 N. E. 230. It is the settled law of this jurisdiction, and in most
others, that where the right to change the beneficiary has been re-
served to the insured in the policy, the beneficiary has a mere ex-
pectancy and not a vested right or interest. Antley v. Life Insurance
Co., 139 S. C. 23, 137 S. E. 199 (1926), 6 A. L. R. 184: Bost v.
Volnteer State Life Insurance Co., 114 S. C. 405, 103 S. E. 771
(1920). The expectancy of the beneficiary of a life policy reserv-
ing to the insured the right to change the beneficiary may not be
defeated except upon substantial compliance with the plan prescribed
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by the policy for changing the beneficiary. Shuler v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of U. S., 184 S. C. 485, 193 S. R. 46 (1937) ;
Wilkie v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co., 187 S. C. 382, 197 S. E. 375
(1938). It has been held that even though voluntary payments of
premiums have been made by a third party or by the beneficiary
it will not deprive the insured of the right to change beneficiary
in accordance with the reservations thereof in the policy, unless
there is an agreement to the contrary. Wintworth v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society, 65 Utah 581, 238 P. 648 (1925). As to the
effect 6f the marriage of an infant, the courts hold that an instru-
ment executed by married infant is voidable the same as that of an
unmarried infant and may be affirmed or disaffirmed after attain-
ing majority. Losey v. Bond, 94 Ind. 67 (1883). The custody of
ap insurance policy has absolutely no effect on an infants rights
reserved therein. The parents or anyone else in possession of policy
of an insured infant has no title to proceeds other than prescribed
in the policy and possession is as a mere custodian. As to the general
law see Tuff v. Smith, 114 S. C. 306, 103 S. E. 551 (1920) ; and as
to infant see Novosel et al v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 49
Wyo. 422, 55 P. 2d 302 (1936). Regardless of the above men-
tioned circumstances, when an infant takes out an insurance policy
the infant has all rights that are reserved therein and if the right
to change beneficiary has been reserved to the insured the infant
may affect such change by compliance with stipulation within policy.
N'ovosel et al v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, supra; Novosel
et al v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, et al, 57 P. 2d 110 (1936).
Few courts have passed upon the right of an infant to change a
beneficiary, but the courts that have, used the basic rules concerning
infants rights from which their conclusions have been drawn. All
courts recognize that infants have the right to enforce all contracts
entered into by them and such are voidable only at their will. An
insurance policy is merely a contract to insure a risk. If the infant
desired to change the beneficiary and the company refused the
infant could simply void his contract and enter into another and
thus affect the desired change. If the court had not reached the
result that it did in the instant case a possible unnecessary hardship
would have been worked upon the insurer and possibly a monetary
loss upon the infant. It must be remembered that a different situa-
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CONTRACTS - Whether a Sum is to be Considered as a Penalty
or as Liquidated Damages.* In response to government advertising
for construction of six disappearing gun carriages when war was
imminent, the claimant submitted four distinct bids, the highest be-
ing for the shortest time of delivery. The Government accepted
the highest bid, with a provision in the contract for a deduction of
$35.00 for each day's delay in delivery. In prior negotiations the
sum was referred to as a "penalty"; that word was also used in a
portion of the contract, but not in the clause pertaining to the sum.
Claimant was late, to an aggregate of 600 days, in delivering the
carriages; whereupon the Government deducted the sum of $21,-
000.00 from the purchase price. In an action to recover this sum,
thus rounding out the full purchase price stipulated in the contract,
the lower court construed the sum to be a penalty and allowed the
claimant to recover on the ground that the Government had suffered
no damage. On appeal, HELD, reversed. Prior negotiations and
the contract indicate that the parties regarded the sum as one for
liquidated damages, that the transaction was of such a nature that
determination of actual damages was virtually impossible, that the
sum was not disproportionate to damages which might result from
breach of a contract of such a nature through failure in timely de-
livery. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Company, 205 U. S. 105
(1907).
The distinction between a penalty and liquidated damages is that
in essence the penalty provided in a contract is a stipulation operat-
ing as a warning or threat, while the essence of liquidated damages
is a genuine covenanted pre-estimate of such damage. Shields v'.
early, 132 Miss. 282, 95 So. 289 (1923); Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre
Co. v. New Garage & Motor Co., A. C. (Eng.) 79 (1915); See
Note, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 935. Liquidated damages are amounts
settled upon in advance of a breach; they may exceed or fall short
of the actual damages sustained, but the sum thus determined in ad-
vance binds both parties to the agreement. Pacific Hardware &
Steel Co. v. United States, 48 Ct. Cl. (Fed.) 399 (1913) ; Thompson
v. Hudson, 79 Ga. App. 807, 47 S. E. 2d 112 (1948). But it is
uniformly held that under a provision construed to be a penalty,
nothing can be recovered for a breach of contract unless actual
damages are sustained. Rispin v. Midnight Oil Co., 291 Fed. 481
(1923); See Note, 34 A. L. R. 1336 (1925); Rubin v. John C.
O(Editor's Note).-In publishing this case-note the South Carolina Law Quarterly is
deviating from its policy of publishing only the most recent cases as topic covered by the
above will be of great interest and value to all attorneys in South Carolina. This case-
note was assigned with instructions to treat the case as though it had been decided in
1950, consequently the statements of law are up to date and include the latest cases.
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Gabler Co., 127 App. Div. 275, 111 N. Y. Supp. 124 (1908). In
the past some courts have preferred to regard a sum stated to be pay-
able if the contract was not fulfilled as a penalty, rather than as liqui-
dated damages, e. g., Shute v. Taylor, 46 Mass..61 (1842) ; Wallis v.
Carpenter, 95 Mass. 19 (1866). The modem tendency, however, is to
allow the parties to make their own contracts and carry out their own
intentions, even where it will result in recovery of the amount stated
as liquidated damages. Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U. S. 224
(1930) ; Wise v. United States, 249 U. S. 361 (1919). The general
rule in determining whether a stipulated sum is to be regarded as
a penalty or as liquidated damages is held to depend upon the intent
of the parties as gathered from a full view of the provisions of the
contract, the terminology expressive of intent, and the subject matter
of the agreement. Gentry v. Recreation, Inc., 192 S. C. 429, 7 S. E.
2d 63 (1940) ; Steeper v. Williams, 48 Pa. St. 450 (1865) ; See Note,
48 A. L. R. 903 (1927). A minority view holds intent to be imma-
terial, the question being whether or not the sum is in fact in the
nature of a penalty. Central Trust Co. v. Wolf, 225 Mich. 8, 237
N. W. 29 (1931), See Note, 78 A. L. R. 843 (1932). In arriving
at intent the courts will look to the form and language of the con-
tract. Tuten v. Morgan, 160 Ga. 90, 127 S. E. 143 (1925) ; Mattes
v. Baird, 176 Okla. 282, 55 P. 2d 48 (1935). But the language
of the instrument is not conclusive. Tuten v. Morgan, supra; Brad-
-shaw v. Millikin, 173 N. C. 432, 92 S. E. 161 (1917). The name
given to a stipulated sum will have no controlling effect if the parties'
intentions appear otherwise. Lindsay v. Anesley, 28 N. C. 186
(1845) ; Ward v. Hudson River Bridge Building Co., 125 N. Y. 230,
26 N. E. 256 (1891). If the contract appear ambiguous, recourse to
prior negotiations may be had in order to determine intent. Brawley
v. United States, 96 U. S. 168 (1878); Simpson v. United States,
199 U. S. 297 (1905). Upon full consideration of a contract the
courts will generally hold a stipulated sum to be a penalty when
actual damages are readily ascertainable. Murray v. Faust, 224
Iowa 50, 276 N. W. 95 (1937) ; Weinstein & Sons v. City of New
York, 289 N. Y. 741, 46 N. E. 2d 351 (1942). A majority of the
courts will also hold that, even in cases in which a stipulated sum
is denominated a "penalty", the sum will be considered as a liquidated
damages rather than as a penalty vihen it is apparent that the par-
ties so intended, when actual damages are uncertain, and when the
stated amount is not disproportionate to what the actual damages
might have been. Ward v. Hudson River Bridge Building Co.,
supra; Grintsley v. Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 154 S. W. 2d 196
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(Tex. Civ. App.) (1941); Summit v. Morris City Traction Co.,
85 N. J. L. 193, 88 Ati. 1048 (1913), See Note L. R. A. 1915E,
385, accord, Widnes Foundry, Ltd. v. Cellulose Acetate Silk Co.,
(1931) 2 K. B. 393, 80 U. Pa. L. Rev. 451 (1931-1932).
The holding of the court, in the case under discussion, is in line
with the weight of authority. To hold the provision to be a penalty
would place upon the Government the burden of proving actual
damage, a virtual impossibility. Upon consideration of the cost of
the gun carriages ($36,000.00 each), the sum of $35.00 per day does
not seem disproportionate to what actual damages might have been.
The lower court undoubtedly arrived at its decision-that the Gov-
ernment suffered no damage - because the war was virtually at an
end when the carriages were delivered. But this fact bears no weight
as, in any action ex contractu, the damages must be ascertained by
viewing the contract as of its inception so as to determine the na-
tural and probable result of a breach. To allow the claimant to re-
cover the full contract price would be to allow it to take advantage
of its own wrong, in that it would receive the highest price for the
longest period of delivery -a circumstance which neither of the
parties intended.
M. A. SHIULER, JR.
DAMAGES - Reversal by Appellate Court Because of Inadequa-
cy of Damages for Wrongful Death. The defendant, while negli-
gently driving his automobile, struck a child of five who, as a result
of the injury, died after several hours of pain and suffering. Pur-
suant to the Mississippi wrongful death statute, the jury brought
in a verdict for plaintiffs, parents of the deceased, for $2,000. On
appeal, HELD, reversed, on the grounds of inadequate damages. In
such an action the party or parties suing shall recover such damages
as the jury may determine to be just, taking into consideration
damages of every kind to the decedent and all damages of every
dnd to all parties interested in the suit. § 1453 Miss. Con op 1942.
The court stated in reversing, "It may be the case that the jury con-
sidered that the proof was not conclusive to show that the death of
the child in question was not the result of an unavoidable accident,
and this view may have influenced the jury in assessing the damages
at only $2,000. However, having found from a preponderance of
evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence and therefore
liable, the jury would not have been warranted in mitigating the
damages, since a five year old child is prima facie incapable of con-
tributory negligence". Gordon v. Lee, 43 So. 2d 665 Miss. (1949).
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judges have the power and are clearly charged with the duty of
setting aside verdicts where damages are either so excessive or so
small as to shock the conscience and to create the impression that the
jury has been influenced by bias or prejudice or has in some way
misconceived or misinterpreted the facts or the law which should
guide them to a just conclusion. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Arring-
ton, 126 Va. 194, 101 S. E. 815 (1919). The verdict of a jury,
awarding $100 for the wrongful death of a 16 year old industrious
and energetic high school boy, was set aside because there was evi-
dence of improper motives guiding the jury in the fixing of the
inadequate amount. Legg v. Jones, 126 W. Va. 757, 30 S. R. 2d
76 (1944). The general rule auhorizing a review and reversal on
grounds of inadequacy of damages assessed in the jury's verdict
applies in instances of wrongful death where the damages are inade-
quate. The verdict, however, will not be set aside by the appellate
court unless the evidence shows a mistaken conclusion was drawn by
the jury due to inadequate presentation of evidence or an incorrect
charge. Clark v. Iowa C. R. Co., 162 Iowa 630, 144 N. W. 332
(1913) ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Street, 164 Ala. 155, 51 So. 306,
(1909). Some appellate courts, however, have reversed the trial
courts, not because of a possible misconception of the evidence by
the jury, but merely because the damages awarded the plaintiff
were inadequate. Wallace v. City of Rock Island, 323 Ill. App.
639, 56 N. E. 2d 636 (1944) ; Belzoni Hardwood Co. v. Cinquinrani,
102 So. 470 (1928). Where the damages granted to the plaintiff
by the jury in the trial court were inadequate, the appellate court
was not abusing its authority by reversing the decision solely upon
the inadequacy of the damages. Danielson v. Carstens Packing
Co., 115 Wash. 516, 197 P. 617 (1921). A verdict of insufficient
damages constitutes in itself a valid case for reversal. McCarty v.
St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 396, 91 S. W. 132 (1905). The rule
in some jurisdictions is that the appellate court should vacate the
trial jury's verdict, and acting as a super-jury award the damages.
Wood v. State, 258 A D 1026, 17 N. Y. S. 2d 69 (1940) ; Skidmore
v. City of Seattle, 138 Wash. 340, 244 P. 545 (1936). Louisiana
for example is a jurisdiction where this rule has been closely followed
and often applied. The Court is averse to increasing the verdicts
of juries, who rarely underestimate damages; but when the jury
has failed to do justice, the court in exercise of its jurisdiction must
do it. Sullivan v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co., 39 La. Ann. 800,
2 So. 586 (1887) ; Williams v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., La. App.
6 So. 2d 79 (1943).
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The result reached in the principal case is in accord with the weight
of authority in this country. No case has been found where the
authority to reverse because of inadequate damages has not been
recognized. This is easily understandable, as the rule of reversal
for excessive damages has long been established. Therefore, it is
the duty of the courts to reverse because of inadequacy of damages
and afford the same protection to the plaintiff, who has fared ill
because of a jury's bias or prejudice or because of the jury's inno-
cent misinterpretation of the pertinent facts, as has long been given
to the defendant in similar circumstances.
MORTIMER M. WEINBERG, JR.
TORTS - Right of Privacy - Publication of Indebtedness. The
defendant finance company sent to the plaintiff a telegram which
read: "Must have March payment immediately or legal action."
Several days later a second telegram was sent to the plaintiff de-
manding payment and repeating the threat of legal action. The
plaintiff brought suit claiming that the telegrams in question damaged
his business standing and held him up to redicule in his community.
The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer that the com-
pWlaint did not state a cause of action. On appeal, HELD, affirmed.
The plaintiff's complaint did not state a cause of action for damages
for violation of the right of privacy, regardless of whether or not
the plaintiff was indebted to the defendant at the time or whether
or not the defendant acted in good faith. Davis v. General Finance
and Thrift Corporation, 57 S. E. 2d 225 (Ga. 1950).
"THe right of privacy has been defined as the right to live one's
life in seclusion without being subject to unwarranted and undesired
publicity, or the right to be let alone." Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky.
225, 37 S. W. 2d 46 (1931). This concept of the right of privacy
has been recognized, by way of dicta, in South Carolina. Holloman
v. Life Insurance Company of Virginia, 192 S. E. 454, 7 S. E. 2d
169 (1940). The attempted collection of a debt by publication to the
world that another has not paid his debt has been held to be an in-
vasion of the right of privacy. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299
S. W. 967 (1927). In a number of cases recovery was allowed on
the theory of an invasion of privacy, for the mental anguish created
by continual threats to bring legal action. Barnett v. Collection
Service Company, 214 Iowa 1313, 242 N. W. 25 (1932). However,
an invasion of the right of privacy must be restricted to "ordinary
7
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sensibility and not to supersensitiveness", and furthermore, it must
be considered in relation to the rights of free speech and free as-
similation of news. Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243
(1940). Many jurisdictions have granted relief only where the
plaintiff has been discredited in the minds of a considerable class
in his community, the criteria being that of libel and slander. Wright
v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, 55 F. Supp. 639 (1944). Truth is not
a defense to an action for an invasion of the right of privacy, and
-neither will malice nor good faith on part of the defendant be con-
sidered. Barber v. Time, Inc., 38 Mo. 1199, 159 S. W. 2d 291
(1942); Cason v. Baskin, supra. The earlier suits for invasion
of the right of privacy usually concerned the use of a person's name
or picture in advertisements without their consent, and later this
cause of action became the best and most used legal weapon against
the "yellow journalism" of the early 1920's. The advantage of bring-
ing such a suit instead of libel is that truth is no defense. The modem
trend seems to be to restrict in scope the right of privacy, and a
very small minority of jurisdictions still refuse to recognize the
doctrine at all. Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel and Warehouse
Company, 222 Wis. 512, 269 N. W. 295 (1936). Two states have
by statute recognized the existence of a cause of action for the in-
vasion of the right of privacy. N. Y. Civii. RIGHTS LAW, §§ 50, 51
(1921); TrAH RiV. SATuuts, §§ 104, 105 (1933). Those cases
holding a publication of indebtedness as an invasion of the right
of privacy have usually involved situations where the defendant was
guilty of flagrant, abusive, and wide spread publication, i. e. radio
and newspaper; placards in the windows of homes, automobiles, and
places of business. In those cases which have allowed recovery for
mental anguish, using an invasion of the right of privacy as a cause
of action, the collector repeatedly used harsh and abusive threats
of legal action to bring about payment.
It would appear that the decision in the instant case is sound, due
to the fact that there was not such a wide publication of the indebted-
ness as to embarrass a reasonable man, and only the supersensitive
person would have suffered the mental anxiety necessary to sustain
this cause of action because of the sending of the two telegrams.
W. J. FDDER.
RAILROADS - Injuries to Animals on or Near Tracks - Presump-
tions and Burden of Proof. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's
train, due to it's negligent operations, struck and killed two calves
belonging to plaintiff. The case was tried before a magistrate with
8
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a jury, and at the conclusion of the evidence, a verdict was directed
in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the evidence offered
by the employees of the defendant completely rebutted the presump-
tion of negligence relied upon by the plaintiff. On appeal, the Cir-
cuit Court held that there was error in not permitting the question
of whether the presumption of negligence had been rebutted, by a
showing of due care, to be submitted to the jury. The Supreme
Court, on appeal by the defendant from the order granting a new trial,
HELD, reversed. Where the evidence is clear and undisputed, the
effect of the presumption of negligence is overcome and need not be
weighed by the jury against unimpeached positive testimony of the
railkoad employees showing due care and that the accident was un-
avoidable.
It has been held that, where a plaintiff proves that his cattle were
killed by a train, he has made out prima facie case of negligence with
the burden of proof to make a satisfactory explanation resting upon
the railroad, Danner v. S. C. R. R. Co., 4 Rich. 329 (1851). The courts
further provided that, in the running of trains, a railroad company
must exercise ordinary care and it is the absence of this degree of care
which makes the company liable for the killing of stock by a running
train. Molair v. Port Royal & Augusta R. R. Co., 29 S. C. 152, 7 S. E.
60 (1888). In a later case, the court sustained this rule upon the prin-
ciple of stare decisis by stating that negligence is to be presumed from
the killing of cattle by a railroad train and that proof of the fact of
killing throws the burden upon the company. Roof v. Railroad, 4
S.C. 61 (1872). This prima facie evidence of negligence must stand
until overthrown by counter-proof. Fuller v. Port Royal & Augusta
R. R. Co., 24 S. C. 132 (1885). This rule was enlarged upon when
the courts held, that where the plaintiff proves that his stock was
killed by a train, he raises a legal disputable presumption of negligence
on the part of the railroad company and this presumption is not affect-
ed by the mere introduction of evidence on the part of the company
unless such evidence is sufficient to rebut this presumption by mak-
ing out affirmatively a case of accident. Joyner v. R. R. Co., 26 S.C.
49, 1 S.E. 52 (1886). This rule of law remains unchanged by the
inactment of statutes requiring stock to be kept enclosed. Jones v.
Cohmbia & Greenville R. R. Co., 20 S.C. 249 (1883). However,
where the general stock law is applicable, a -railroad company is not
required to use the same degree of care and caution as in localities
where the law is not in force. Harley v. R. R. Co., 31 S.C. 151, 9
S.4. 782 (1888). Such a stock law is a circumstance which the jury
can take into consideration in passing on the question of negligence.
Davis v. Florida Central & Penn. R. R., 47 S.C. 390, 25 S.E. 224
9
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(i896). It is a question for the jury to decide as to whether there
was sufficient evidence on the part of the defendant railroad company
to rebut the presumption of negligence. Ervin v. A. C. L. R. R. Co.,
106 S.C. 354, 91 S.E. 317 (1916). The jury may, if it sees fit,
disregard all the evidence instructed by the defendant and find that
it was negligent by the mere fact that stock was killed by its train.
Perrynuan v. Charleston & W. C: Ry. Co., 105 S.C. 34, 91 S.E. 317
(1916). Evidence of the employees of the defendant does not rebut
the presumption of negligence but tends to do so and leaves it as a
question for the jury. McLeod v. A. C. L. R. R. Co., 93 S.C. 71,
76 S.E. 19 (1912). The South Carolina rule on the evidentiary
value of presumptions is, to the effect, that when any fact raises a
presumption of negligence such fact alone, stands as evidence of
negligence throughout the trial to be weighed by the jury with the
rebutting evidence of the defendant. Baker v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., 87 S.C. 174, 69 S.E. 151 (1910). The general rule
followed in the majority of jurisdictions in the United States is
that, in the absence of a statute, the mere fact that an animal was
killed on the track raises no presumption of negligence on the part
of the railroad and the burden is upon the plaintiff to show such negli-
gence. 52 C.J. 107.
The rule in Danner's Case, as developed by the later cases, is an
exception to this general rule in that a presumption was created
by killing stock on the railroad. This presumption did not go
out upon the introduction of substantial contradicting evidence of
the defendant but remained a question for the jury as to whether
the presumption was rebutted by the railroad's evidence. The
reason for this rule was the difficulty in obtaining evidence other
than that supplied by the railroad's employees, which may be
biased, thereby putting an undue hardship upon the plaintiff. This
continued as law for nearly one hundred years during which time
the railroad companies never ceased their attempts to have this rule
changed. Other jurisdictions have adopted statutes which provided
that a prima fade case of negligence is made out against the rail-
road when sfock is injured on the tracks. Courts in these jurisdic-
tions hold that the presumption goes out when evidence is introduced
to contradict it. The present case changed the rule in Danner's Case
and held that a verdict would be directed for the defendant where
it introduced clear and undisputed testimony. It is submitted that
this decision reduced the status of such a presumption to a rule of
evidence subject to the rules on presumptions of fact.
WIujAM H. DUNCAN.
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